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Abstract 
 
This research proposes new model of officials’ evaluation grounded on a belief regarding to the urgency of a framework which embraces 
socio-political aspects holistically. This is derived from national vision in sustainability development demanding a more transparent, 
reliable, and competent leadership. Regarding to this, distortions often occur due to governance malpractices in the form of corruption 
which impact officials’ performance as well as environment conduciveness. This phenomenon is taken as a fundamental paradigm of this 
research which results in a reasoning stating that officials’ objective evaluation. This research realizes that cannot be done by considering 
officials as a single-role entity. It must consider several roles which impacts and influences several different parties (political, social, and 
governmental). This research comprehends such gap through comprehensive literature review and transforms all theories in the purpose 
of building a systematic assessment methodology which captures various aspects from different perspective. In its discussion, this model 
is proven academically to be able to evaluate officials’ performance objectively through three broad parameters: (1) policies formulation, 
(2) social engagement, and (3) regulatory submission. In addition, those three categorical assessment would be integrated in a weighted-
average system, enabling them to produce a numerical score. In this stage, this framework is applied through information technology is 
used to capture data from different respondents. 
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1. Introduction  
For National sustainability is inevitably influenced by good na-
tional governance practices whereas, transparency and accounta-
bility are the background components of good governance. Sand-
erson et al. [1] suggests that, good governance practices are still 
searching for a harmony between well-structured management 
control and efficient operations. To respond, several frameworks 
present different views of governance principle which pinpoint the 
executive officers as the pole of code of conduct [1]. Notwith-
standing, the rest of topics guide readers to discussion of control. 
The weightiness of internal control is a motor of good governance 
in which, Marume [2] states that all procedures decided by execu-
tive officers (as organizational executors) reflects how proportion-
al directors could stabilize the dynamic of information flows [2]. 
In other words, a leader is expected to be a management environ-
mental controller through his/her policies [3]. 
Black [4] discusses that, in any form of statue, officers are con-
tracted to exercise their duties in a good faith (bona-fide) meaning 
that, any decisions and programs must be taken with a special care 
and diligence. These liabilities are bind as higher supervisory 
agencies charged with performance assessment apprehend the 
accordance of officials’ performances towards particular acts and 
regulations [4]. Legally, any failure is considered as law contra-
vention specifically, public officials’ duties are rooted to a more 
severe pole which is state constitutions whereas, criminal indict-
ments are always closely attributed to public law [5]. Furthermore, 
officials must exercise their duties professionally meaning that, 
engaging all procedures fairly by eliminating speculative allega-
tions of corruption of which, as a problem of many hands, cannot 
be limited to either officers’ conduct or monetary benefit rather, to 
both transactional environment, supervision system, and power 
exercising duties [6]. 
This research is done based on a belief that corruption complexity 
can be narrowed through an equitable approach. Due to its ex-
traordinary financial and non-financial impacts [7], society’s per-
ceptions regarding to officers’ performance must be engaged as it 
neutralizes deviated and partial perception from industry sector 
and supervisory boards although this research realizes the im-
portance of both parties’ perception [8].  Therefore, embracing all 
parties to create a holistic view of officials is the idea to present a 
fair preliminary consideration. In the light of officers’ misconduct, 
this model contributes on unfair treatment signal given by particu-
lar sectors. It further assists national investigation bureaus to act 
efficiently without expensing unnecessary expenditures. This 
sense is a perfection of efficient good governance code whereas, 
open assessment is done democratically through public engage-
ment. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Ontology of Public Responsibilities 
Generally, this terminology is defined as a systematic process of 
which society’s interests and affairs are served and managed pro-
portionally [9]. Marume [2] explains its narrowest definition as an 
executive part of governance whose duty is to ensure that public 
needs are fulfilled and facilitated. Thus, their administrative duty 
must cohere to and be carried out laws including all discretions as 
statutory implementation. Functionally, it is recognized that, exec-
utive is an integral part since it is over-watched by both legislature 
and judiciary whereas, in a managerial view, administrative duty 
is limited to decision-making roles [2]. In the governance perspec-
tive, executive officers are burdened a day-to-day operations re-
quiring their professional judgement towards any situation which 
might influence decision-making process whereas, care, diligence, 
and bona-fide (to act in a good faith) are basic requirement [4]. 
Therefore, as elements such as supervision, law, and executive 
duties faced, then the terminology of public responsibility emerges.  
Grounded on the philosophy of political state, in the society, exec-
utives are expected to create harmony and fair practices between 
the permanence (law of the state) and the inheritance (demograph-
ical norms) for the purpose of balanced continuation [10]. Accord-
ing to the concept of sustainability, the term responsibility is car-
ried out in the context of both social and environmental security 
for economic purposes [11] whereas, translated to executives’ 
liabilities context, performing duties based on law and preserving 
political ideology are cleverly done in a certain political method-
ologies which do not confront local ethical norms [12]. This must 
be noticed whereas, social acceptance towards governmental 
thought regarding to local development must be put in advance. If 
not, these are often turned to racial and ideological issues elevated 
as either political gimmicks or infiltrating foreign-espionage for 
either partial purposes or disintegration [13].  
Practically, an equilibrium of socio-politics orders must be equally 
comprehended by both society and politician. In the context of the 
democratic state, citizenry depute public administrators to govern 
with a constitutional and ideological responsibilities in which, 
those are often contrary to one each other [14]. In developing 
countries, where society is disintegrated in various categories, 
sustainable development programs are stunned due to inefficient 
political-deals [15] which can be solved through programs in eco-
nomics welfare [16]. Executives are also charged to suppress the 
potential conflicts through discretions and socializations which 
head on how local people could get advantaged by any govern-
mental sustainable development program [17]. Finally, emerging 
trends of infrastructure acceleration allow private enterprises to 
execute the plans efficiently however, deficiencies e.g. various 
corruption schemes and minority victimization are probably inevi-
table which would be the ultimate accentuation of public respon-
sibilities [18].  
2.2. The Complexity of Corruption 
Corruption is a popular term for abuse of power especially when 
dealing with officers’ both formal and non-formal norms to en-
gage third-party transactions which deliver either or both econom-
ic or/and non-economic benefits [19]. Specifically, Transparency 
International (TI) [20] engages to such understanding similarly in 
which, independent views regarding to particular personal conduct 
are preferably used to determine certain misconduct. Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) (an assessment issued by TI) is used as a 
pole to assess nations’ corruption level based on commensurate 
criterion. It places almost 70% of countries worldwide as corrupt-
ed countries [20]. However, it is criticized that it could be more 
reliable when contextual considerations take place [21]. Moreover, 
a study case shows that even national corruption index must be 
ratified through regional studies considering more specific views 
[22]. A survey is argued to be reliable where naive perception 
from society as a “political watchdog” is used neutralizing ex-
treme view from both supervisory and industrial parties [17, 23]. 
Thus, political perspective of corruption must be complicated for 
its transactional nature forcing experts to map any partial linkages. 
This nature can only be comprehended through investigation on 
individuals (which takes a long-period of time) to depict the 
scheme [19]. Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE)’s 
fraud tree model categorizes corruption into two natures: (i) domi-
nating transactions which occur in procurement processes with 
vendors’ tender process [24] and (2) smoothing decisions which 
happen in administrative discretion [25]. Accordingly, Snider [26] 
explains that entities’ domination in transactions through bribery 
in tender process and solicit cooperation with procurement officers. 
These issues are difficult to handle, as an issue with procurement 
leadership should embrace beyond procurement procedures [26]. 
In addition, Ionescu [27] proposes that nations with democratic-
parliamentary system consisted of parties practicing politics based 
on majority are prone to create inequality. Furthermore, it is re-
quired for candidates to be self-sufficient for political campaign 
although, it is practically intended to secure certain chair. This 
scheme is executed through either economic extortion or illegal 
gratuities [27].  
Those schemes categorized as petty corruption could likely be 
executed single-handedly by corruptors [28] of which, it is suffi-
cient to make cons and tricks when little group of crooks are ready 
to cooperate whereas, the narrow the scope, the safer it would 
likely be, as  However, grand corruption could influence organiza-
tion’s components to utilize other activities through create an or-
ganizational behavior whereas, information falsifications and as-
sets misappropriations are allowed as far as either the course of 
action is to quicken daily transactions or the objectives is accom-
plished neatly [29]. First, the nature of fraudulent financial reports 
in governmental area is unlike the likelihood of corporate fraud 
nonetheless, it employs overstatement and understatement tech-
niques for the purpose of third-party benefits [30]. Furthermore, 
asset misappropriation is considered as equivalent to corruption 
[31]. This employs billing schemes and check tempering which 
also embrace creative accounting techniques to disguise any dis-
crepancy [32]. 
An administrator who breaches law of governmental administra-
tion is imposed by criminal sanction for they have no reason to 
refer officers’ civil code of conduct i.e. duty of care, duty of exer-
cising in good faith, and duty of being free from conflict of inter-
est [4]. Rather, an official appointed and entrusted based on na-
tional statutes could not be excused for law violation. The philos-
ophy of ethics is emphasized whereas, according to Barbara 
Kudrycka regarding to administrative relation in which, public 
administration is categorized as one of metaphysical ethics dealing 
with accepted ethical norms applied on daily professional activi-
ties [33] whereas, society hopes for officers fairness and account-
ability in administrative and bureaucratic processes. Several mac-
roeconomic studies show corruption as one of challenges for na-
tional sustainable development, believably takes effect on failures 
of nations in reducing unemployment and poverty [34, 35]. Other 
studies prove that corruption shuts down political fairness and 
accountability turning democracy into tyrannical majority [13, 36] 
which are considered as barriers for sustainable development and 
triggers for potential criminality. 
As its environmental effects, corruption causes government to 
issue statutes and policies for accountable bureaucratic procedures. 
These stages consume both time and expenditure for comprehen-
sive considerations based on academic and political discourses 
take place expensing administrative costs [37]. Another reason is 
the amount of economic loss due to corruption. This is meant to be 
the loss occurred in industrial sector when corporate executives 
choose to commit corruption scheme with government, govern-
mental sector when officials misappropriate funds, and political 
sector when members of representative fall into similar schemes 
[38]. Further, detecting corruption causes bigger disbursement 
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which force most of nations worldwide to form anti-corruption 
body, describing this as an extraordinary crime [39]. However, the 
cost could get potentially higher considering corruption could 
happen within governmental agencies. This is compounded by 
unjust jurisdiction towards perpetrators whereas, even corruption 
eradication organizations could treat them partially. 
2.3. The Role of Perception 
Perception is one of the components, stated by Etienne Bonnot de 
Condillac, that forms conscious behavior verifying objects de-
pendently and sensibly in spite of others i.e. memory, judgement, 
and willingness which are elaborators of human’s sensation [40]. 
Using the source of society’s dependence and sense, those could 
portray the impact of administrators towards the societal leader-
ship. A good leadership believably, in the context of management 
control, neutralizes the environment causing its surroundings to be 
less tempestuous [41]. Furthermore, perception might indicate 
society satisfaction towards officials by simply allowing them to 
have on self-reflection creating self-perception regarding to their 
life quality. This is grounded on Bem’s [42] self-perception theory 
(SPT) saying that human interprets their reaction upon an object 
frankly without any external intervention. This method is applica-
ble to samples (society) who do not possess any obvious insight 
(e.g. political administration) even, this works to those who view 
things ambiguously [42]. This assessment methodology could also 
embrace the quality of public service whereas, public opinion 
plays great role in officials’ performance. 
It is also necessary to take industrial and bureaucratic perceptions 
as considerations whose roles (i.e. providers and invigilators) 
place them closely with the officials. Industries, through public-
private partnership (PPP) scenario, must adhere governmental 
requirements in order to be the project executors by competing 
others to offer the most beneficial goods and services whereas, 
problem occurs when officials committing corruption schemes 
spoiling tender process [24]. As it happens, parties aggrieved 
could provide information regarding to such unfair practices. As 
ACFE’s survey puts whistleblowers’ tip as the most efficient fraud 
detection [43], this idea might be the key to uncover administra-
tors’ malpractices despite, this can also be used as a political tool 
for character assassination. As its limitation, higher governmental 
authority is relied due to its credibility and reliability in officials’ 
evaluation. Any attempt conspiring an executive’s wrongful im-
peachment might be prevented by objective assessment from the 
state [29]. 
This must be treated as both equal-weighted and complementary 
to one each other. These principles are including but not limited to 
general term of industrial, administration, and supervisory general 
assessment. An inter-disciplinary analytical approach must be 
conducted to assure its reliability [14]. For instance, engaging on 
semantic differential scale might be more preferable to depict 
perception [44]. In doing so, linguistic methodology must also be 
embraced whereas, it must rhetorically guide respondents to create 
self-perception unbiasedly without any tendentious motives be-
hind the questionnaires. This is the core of utilizing social percep-
tion due to a speck of hearsay might change everything [45]. Fur-
thermore, establishment of evaluations’ components must cohere 
in the respect of applicable academic theories to fathom the fair-
ness of tender process between government and industries, politi-
cal contracts to measure societies’ satisfaction regarding to offi-
cials’ performance, and constitutional laws to comprehend the 
credibility of administrators. 
3. Discussions 
As the literature discussion, the framework built covers all areas 
whereas, it is expected that one dimension could be both view 
singularly and complementary. This framework is designed to 
produce figures which requires personal judgment to define the 
data by considering officials as: (1) policy makers, (2) administra-
tive leaders, and (3) bureaucratic subordinates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: New framework of officials’ evaluation 
 
3.1. Officials as Policy Makers 
The framework’s philosophy consists of three sources. First, con-
sidering high fraud risk in PPP agreements, this model adopts 
“Iron Triangle”, a cycle which defines the politicial-economy of 
regulation within United States (US) governance processes. Ac-
cording to Adams [46], this model is acknowledged to be widely 
applicable since many countries experience similar trends. This 
model defines that public policy is created through involvement of 
congress members (a.k.a politicians), interest groups (a.k.a indus-
tries), and bureaucratic officers (a.k.a administrators). In the light 
of corruption, this model provides possible scenarios of conspira-
cy i.e. (1) illegal funding and political support (congress – bureau-
cracy relationships), (2) low regulations allowing favourisitms 
(bureaucracy – interest group relationships), and (3) unfair elec-
toral support (interest group – congress relationships) [46]. Since 
the model is focused on officials’ conduct, then modified model is 
presented to portray officers’ performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Modified Iron Triangle from Adams (1981) 
Objective 
Officials 
Evaluation 
3 schemes of 
Iron Triangle 
3 main ideas 
of governance 
3 bureaucratic 
submissions 
1. Politicians – regulators relationship 
2. Politicians and industries – regulators relationship 
3. Industries – regulators relationship 
1. How excellent the citizens’ life quality 
2. How well the quality of public service 
3. How good the quality of governmental leadership 
1. Commission of corruption eradication 
2. Institution of national supreme financial audit 
3. House of national representative 
Scheme 2-3 
Scheme 1-3 
Scheme 1/2-3 
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Table 1: Probable political schemes on iron triangle [46] 
Schemes (1) Ethical Offence, (2) Expected Political Advantage, and (3) Who Assess 
Scheme 1-3 
 
Politician 
– 
Official 
1. Good governance is not practiced ethically since politicians’ interests setting aside society trends and needs pursuing their 
objectives. Regulations issued by politicians usually secure regulators position including politicians influence towards gov-
ernment including public. In this context, companies with strong entanglement with parliament are usually prioritized to run 
the projects, involving bid rigging. 
2. Governance system seems to be more stable without any conflicted interests due to governmental discretions which favor 
politicians. Politicians then hook up with their business partners as third party stakeholders as an act supporting their officials’ 
supremacy as political puppets. 
3. Industrial subject (non-selected companies) can be relied upon since they are economically victimized by unfair tender pro-
cess. 
Scheme 2-3 
 
Industry 
– 
Official 
1. Good governance is not practiced ethically since politicians who are assumed capable in administrative supervision are politi-
cally disabled. Disabling supervision can be done through illegal gratuities given by businessman to people at the parliament. 
2. Governance circumstance seems to be favorable for officials since all projects are run efficiently. As long as the watchdogs are 
kept replete, all transactions could flow in secure. This systematic conspiracy is described, in the long-run, as institutionalized 
corruption.  
3. Politician can be relied upon since there ought not to be a generalization regarding to corrupted politician. The philosophy is 
derived from the ratification of Aristotle terminology: “Zoon Politicon” whereas, “the animals of politics” should be turned to 
“the animals involved in politics”. 
Scheme 1/2-3 
 
Politician/Industry  
– 
Official 
1. Good governance is not practiced ethically since officials have no authority to run their administrative function, managing 
day-to-day administration. The conglomerates’ influence overs politicians override executives’ duties using illegal incentives, 
ensuring that officials authorize transaction favoring them. Somehow, it takes another gratuity to make officials more coopera-
tive through purchasing, sales, and kickback schemes.  
2. Governance circumstance seems to be run fluently considering the mouth of public officials are shouted. However, a blow of a 
whistle could set up a flame either from society or supervisory boards. Another case is when officials could maintain their in-
tegrity, social turmoil could be played by corporate-politics intelligences to frame the officials in various ways therefore, they 
are dismounted and prosecuted. In many cases, chaos happens and is used as methodology to clean such black records. 
3. Officials (who are loyal with the constitution) can be relied as whistle-blower to uncover any politician-industry scheme. This 
requires clean supervisory board who enact the law and statutes straightly.  
 
3.2. Officials as Administrative Leaders 
Governors, in any statute, either civil or commonwealth law sys-
tems, are bound to law and statutes. This research observes stat-
utes and acts constituted by both civil and commonwealth law 
countries as a proof of which local government play similar roles 
in every nation. Aragonès et al. [47] highlights the trends of which 
initial campaign of an executive is mainly driven to and nuanced 
in an improvement of local citizens’ life quality. Defining political 
promise, historical aspect (e.g. reputation) could determine the 
degree of public trust [47]. Further, it is revealed by Granato and 
Wong [48], considering the unbiased crystallization perception 
towards a candidate is often manipulated through the use of politi-
cal rhetoric shocking voters’ psychology in which the most unfor-
tunate circumstance is when voted candidates renege from fulfil-
ment [48]. 
 
Table 2: Observed local government / municipalities regulations 
Nations Source of Law The Code (English term)  
France 
Classic French-Roman law 
with the influence of demo-
cratic republican state  
La Constitution de 1958 (Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales) – The Constitution of 1958 
(the General Code on Local Authorities) 
“…mayor, as a representative of the State, has competence in the field of registry, electoral issues, 
social welfare, education, local roads and planning, and public order…municipalities as decentralized 
authorities, have competence in the field of municipal transport, culture, public health, economic, 
environmental, and residential development.” [49] 
Netherlands 
Classic French-Roman law 
with the influence of monar-
chy constitutional state from 
Germany 
Gemeentewet Hoofdstuk X (De bevoegdheid van het college van burgemeester en wethouders) & XI 
(De bevoegdheid van de burgemeester) – Municipalities Act Chapter 10 (Powers of Municipal 
Executive) & 11 (Powers of the Major) 
Chapter 10: “…to ensure healthcare and residential services readiness…to ensure economic and envi-
ronmental sustainability…”; and Chapter 11: “…to exercise all political, educational, and other gen-
eral affairs in accordance with local orders and national constitution…” [50] 
Indonesia 
Self-constituted French-
Roman law with com-
munism-liberalism adoption 
Undang-Undang No.32 Tahun 2004, pasal 22 – Law no.32, 2004, Chapter 22 
“…to run local government by carrying out national ideology based on the constitution …to enhance 
the quality of social livelihood…to improve facilities for education, healthcare, social, and general 
affairs…to preserve sustainable environment and local social norms and execute civil administration’s 
discretions and statutes fairly and equitably.”  [51] 
 
 
Republic of 
China 
Self-constituted French-
Roman law with communism 
influence 
中华人民共和国立法法, 第四章, 第 1 节 – Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(Presidential Order No.31, 2000, Chapter IV, s1 
“...to practice based on constitution…to formulate local regulation and implement it in the light of 
actual and local condition of a respective administrative area, within the limits of the special economic 
zones, and on the basis of the political, economic, and cultural characteristics…” [52] 
Russia 
Classic French-Roman law 
with communism influence 
Конституция Российской Федерации (1993 год) – Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993), 
Article 12 
“…to handle local administrations in accordance to the constitution…to tackle matters of local signifi-
cance and municipal property management…to manage facilities comprehensively: education, social 
policy, healthcare and sport services, culture and leisure, public utilities, traffic and transport, urban 
development, and governmental administration...” [53] 
India 
Commonwealth law with 
Sharia’ and Hinduism’ influ-
ences  
The Functioning of Panchayats after 73rd Amendment Act, 1992 Part IX  
“…to organize village…as a self-governed unit” thus, “…endowed with functions obligatorily (i.e. 
civil administration, water supply, public streets maintenance, and social facilities) and discretionarily 
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(i.e. policies for housing, greening, and constructions)“ [54] 
Malaysia 
Commonwealth law with 
particular Sharia’ adjustments 
Laws of Malaysia Act 171, Local Government Act 1976 
“Part II s8 is related to daily administrative duties of officers, Part VII s63, s64, s65, and s66 are relat-
ed with discretionary acts of public places; and Part XII s102, s106, s120, and s121 are related to ex-
ecutive powers to constitute the code in doctrine of precedent” [55] 
United King-
dom 
Commonwealth law 
Local Government Act 2002 Part I and Part VI s105 
“Part I of the Act deals with conducts which promote economic, social, and environmental well-being 
and Part VI s105 of the Acts deal with executives’ policies made in accordance to both public order 
and doctrine of precedent” [56] 
Australia Commonwealth law 
Local Government (General) Regulations 2005 
“Part 2 Div.3 (water supply, sewerage, and storm-water drainage work), Div.4 (waste management), 
and Div.5 (activities on community land, public roads, and other activities); Part 3 Div.3 (preservation 
of healthy environmental condition); and Part 7 Div.2 (discretionary tender for infrastructure project 
execution via PPP agreement)” [57] 
United States 
of America 
Commonwealth law 
U.S. Code, Title 42, Chapter 68, Subchapter IV-B Part A, §5195-5196 
§5196: “…to study and develop emergency preparedness measures design to afford adequate protec-
tion of life and property…”; §5195: “…emergency preparedness is all activities and measures taken to 
minimize the effects of hazard towards society…formation of well-trained organizations, passive-
defensive military regulation, and emergency medical and armed-rescue ops…” [58] 
 
Viewing different constitution in the context of life quality im-
provement, there are two punctuations in both social program 
(commonwealth law) and normative value (civil law) which might 
be influenced by its doctrine (doctrine of precedent vs. interpreta-
tional liberty. Viewing this, considering equitable point of view, 
good public officials must be able to, by reckoning their wisdom, 
comprehend the local norms and implement those practically in a 
way that, governmental programs may not trigger any conflict [1]. 
This research uses this methodology to set an assessment in the 
public service and governmental leadership excellences. In com-
plicated and diversified states, carrying infrastructure development 
programs to improve the local life quality through general facili-
ties in conditions where policies made preserve local culture and 
value, law enforced fairly and transparently, and governance sys-
tem is reliable, could arouse societies’ satisfaction [59]. 
 
 
 
3.3. Officials as Bureaucratic Subordinates 
The third domain of assessment is to treat administrators bureau-
cratically whereas, house of representative and supreme court 
watch over them. As there are three functions of government, this 
research finds three risks to prevent: (1) arbitrary policies, (2) 
unaccountable financial reporting, and (3) corrupt practices [60]. 
This idea is taken based on considerations where the first evalua-
tion does not engage citizens’ perception at all and the second one 
relies fully on society, the third part, as a balancer, embraces both 
house of representative as a symbol of society and supreme court 
as a representation of justice. In addition, as several nations’ mu-
nicipal act insert statutes in audit and transparency, opinions pro-
vided by governmental agencies working on periodic examination 
must be considered as objective assessment. In other words, in 
case of bias probability, this assessment cannot be rejected since 
this is formal information authorized by the state 
 
          
 
 
 
Figure 3: Common national surveillance system 
 
4. Conclusion  
Hence, the model built in this research gives a new solution which 
is applicable for any political state. Given a trend whereas a fair 
assessment towards public administrators is urgently demanded, 
for the purpose of good governance practices executed based on 
the principles of democracy, societies are involved to assess exec-
utives’ performances. However, as such naïve perception is easily 
bended by political tactics, then parties to which executives must 
be transactionally dealing and bureaucratically complying with, 
must be considered as other important dimension of officials’ 
assessment as they understand the actual real state of affairs. In a 
discussion of officials’ occupational fraud scheme (corruption), it 
is realized that its extraordinary effects could likely to inflict all 
parties either financially or non-financially. As such, this new 
framework may portray officials’ conduct in the perspective of 
transactional fairness, social satisfaction, and legal compliance. 
Furthermore, solving corruption cases in a complex political envi-
ronment containing machinations and gimmicks is not simple 
whereas, good governors’ policies and conducts are possibly not 
delightful for everybody. Therefore, perception built through this 
framework can be viewed in either separated or integrated func-
tion. Through this, state can establish an examination proving 
either their innocence or wickedness. This function could facilitate 
either further examination and judiciary process compressing the 
extraordinary cost of corruption. Finally, considering the future 
implementation which might inflame conflict, government politi-
1 
2 
3 
1. Representative watch 
appointed officials 
based on society’s 
satisfaction. 
2. Representative and 
judiciary watch 
officials’ performance 
from any non-
unqualified audit 
opinion. 
3. Judiciary watch 
officials for any 
breach of duties 
(corruption) through 
corruption eradication 
commission. 
Notes for Figure 3: 
 
Three functions of govern-
ment: 
 
 Legislative (house of 
representatives) 
 Executive (public 
administrators) 
 Judiciary (supreme 
court) 
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cal wisdom and intelligence must be carried out whereas, there 
should be a radical movement against corruptions. 
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